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Abstract
This paper analyses intermediary organisations in developing economy agricultural clusters. The
paper critically engages with a growing narrative in studies of intermediaries that have stressed the
ownership structure of intermediaries as a key driver for enabling knowledge transfer, inter-firm
learning and upgrading of small producers in clusters. Two case studies of Latin American clusters
are presented and discussed. The study suggests that in addition to ownership structure, cluster
governance and the embeddedness of intermediaries in clusters are critical factors that need to
be taken into account in understanding the influence of intermediaries in the upgrading of small
producers in clusters.
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Introduction
In this paper, we discuss the role intermediary organisations can play in the development of
emerging agribusiness clusters in developing countries.1 We engage with a growing narrative
in studies of intermediaries that has stressed the ownership structure of intermediary
organisations as a key driver for (strategically) enabling knowledge transfer and inter-ﬁrm
learning at the cluster level (Goldberger, 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009; Provan and Kenis,
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2008; Intarakumnerd and Chaoroenporn, 2013). In particular, the argument is made that
intermediaries with a public–private governance (PPG) can have ‘‘multiparty’’ governance
by combining a private sector drive to establish cross-cutting ties with diﬀerent organisations
outside the cluster whilst at the same time the public sector ethos can ensure there is
participatory governance in the cluster, facilitating inclusion of small producers in the
adoption of new organisational and technological innovations (Zuckerman and Sgourev,
2006). Great emphasis by policy makers is therefore placed on the agency of the intermediary
at the cluster level to achieve inclusive economic transformations.
Whilst the above argument is compelling, particularly for policy makers looking for
useful levers to intervene in clusters, we urge some caution and suggest that the analysis
of the potential impact of intermediaries needs to take into account at least two additional
factors. Firstly, that the inﬂuence of the intermediary is likely to vary signiﬁcantly according
to the governance of inter-producer relations at the cluster level, including for example the
degree of collective organisation or unequal access to markets by some organisations
over others. Secondly, it is necessary to consider that whilst the breadth of the
economic activities in clusters that can beneﬁt upgrading has opened up new spaces for
intermediation, this space can draw in many organisations undertaking intermediary
functions that have deep local roots with varied ownership structures, motivations and
incentives. Therefore, the relational network position (central, periphery) of diﬀerent
intermediaries with respect to other organisations will aﬀect its inﬂuence. Moss (2009)
deﬁnes the basic function of intermediaries as the collective pursuit of public, common or
individual interests and that a deﬁning asset of intermediaries is their ability to reap
collective beneﬁts. However, as will be seen, the expansion of both functions and
organisations undertaking intermediary activities means that the relationship between
intermediaries and other organisations will be complex and multifaceted and can involve
a range of organisations that assume intermediary roles (Moss, 2009; Klerkx and Aarts,
2013). Our enquiry is therefore guided by the following questions:
. How does the ownership structure of intermediary organisations (public, private, or PPG)
inﬂuence inter-producer governance relations in terms of the upgrading activities of small
producers?
. How does the position of diﬀerent intermediaries in the cluster inﬂuence inter-producer
governance relations in terms of the upgrading activities of small producers?
Two case studies of emerging clusters in developing country settings are presented – the
mango cluster in Piura, northern Peru and a cluster of Palm oil producers in central
Colombia. We discuss intermediaries with three types of ownership structure: private
organisations, producer associations and an organisation with a public–private ownership
governance.
We begin the discussion by posing the opportunities for upgrading through new
trading arrangements, fragmentation of value chains and the outsourcing of some service
functions. We then engage in a critical discussion of the narrative that upgrading can
be enhanced by the intervention of an intermediary with a public private ownership
structure that encourages both inclusion and entrepreneurship. This claim is discussed
with reference to cluster structure and governance of inter-producer relationships.
We suggest that intermediary organisations can indeed play a crucial role in upgrading
by means of networking, but that this inﬂuence will in part dependent on structures
of pre-existing relations between producers involved in upgrading of value chains and
the degree of embeddedness of the intermediary in the cluster. We conclude with
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reﬂections both on agricultural cluster development and on the study of intermediation more
generally.
Evolving opportunities for intermediaries in value chains
Debates over how to facilitate the upgrading of agricultural producers in developing
country value chains has gone through diﬀerent stages. By upgrading we refer to the
capacity of organisations (or small-sized producers) to increase the value added of
processes or products (Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). During the
1980s and 1990s, a market-led approach was preferred in the belief that the upgrading
challenge could be resolved by improving access to international markets and lowering
transaction costs to trade. Whilst this introduced macro-economic stability, only a small
number of large ﬁrms in some sectors were able to respond and most medium and small-
sized ﬁrms were excluded (McDermott et al., 2009). A second approach emphasised the
importance of external linkages in global value chains (Gereﬃ et al., 2005; Kaplinsky and
Morris, 2001). The opportunities for upgrading here will largely depend on the
governance of the value chain, some local, but more often global, and cooperation with
key suppliers and sub-contractors. In natural resource settings, hierarchical and quasi-
hierarchical relations tend to play a key role in assisting in the upgrading of production
capabilities, particularly around quality standards and certiﬁcations (Gereﬃ, 1994;
Schmitz and Knorringa, 2001).
A third and more recent development emphasises how countries react to and experiment
with a growing patchwork of transnational regulatory integration (Bruszt and McDermott,
2014). Some of these regulations have encouraged buyers to reduce the number of suppliers
and focus on large partners, excluding small and medium-sized producers. Nevertheless,
there is also some evidence of greater use of incremental experiments and adaption to
rules (Perez-Aleman, 2010) that reﬂect a degree of joint problem-solving and building
of local capabilities (McDermott and Ruiz, 2014). Thus, value chains with new channels
of integration and more heterogeneous arrangements have emerged, with small producers
from developing countries operating in both low value and in some cases higher value
specialised niche activities (OECD, 2015) through new arrangements based on ethical
trading standards (Barrientos et al., 2011).
The incorporation of small producers in some agribusiness value chains and the focus on
building local capacity has brought to relief the need create a strong institutional
infrastructure at local level (Bebbington et al., 2008) to facilitate upgrading since,
although buyer ﬁrms set the standards of production, they have not always been prepared
to assume the role of transferring knowhow, leaving the task of capability building to local
service providers (Gereﬃ, 1994; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2001). Such a trend is particularly
prominent for small-scale agribusiness producers. As Gomes (2007) in her study of the
Brazilian fruit sector suggests, a change in buyer behaviour has taken place in areas
where product diﬀerentiation is less prominent, with greater responsibility for upgrading
placed upon local institutions. Consequently, local service providers and intermediaries have
had to increasingly assume the task of building both vertical (external) and horizontal
(cluster) relationships and helping local actors overcome the hurdles to the achievement of
consistent quality, logistics and establishing a scientiﬁc base for testing and measurement of
quality standards (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). Hence, as new market opportunities appear
and establish themselves through value chains, new local governance arrangements emerge
that attempt to re-embed the local economy through a combination of local and global
regulations, both public and private (Barrientos et al., 2011).
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The new space for intermediation has led to an extensive range of, what sections of the
literature have identiﬁed as intermediary activities. In particular, Howells’ (2006)
typology of intermediaries in innovation activities drew attention to the varied and
holistic role played by intermediaries than was previously recognised. In the area of
both industrial clusters and agribusiness clusters, a range of studies (for example, Bell
and Giuliani, 2007; Batterink et al., 2010; Caniels and Romijn, 2003; Clarke and Ramirez,
2014; Kilelu et al., 2013, 2017a; Mmari, 2015; Poulton et al., 2010; Shou and
Intarakumnerd, 2013; Szogs, 2008; Szogs et al., 2011; Visser and Atzema, 2008;
Watkins et al., 2015) have increasingly underlined the roles of intermediation,
particularly in knowledge transfer. Intermediation also includes activities supporting
local producers by improving vertical and horizontal coordination roles (Bolwig et al.,
2011; Kilelu et al., 2017b; Poulton et al., 2010) and enabling the collective action of
producers (Kilelu et al., 2017a; Poulton et al., 2010). Intermediaries are also argued to
help in the upgrading of producers in terms of process and product upgrading,
introducing better production methods to boost cluster performance and in enhancing
compliance with quality standards (Iizuka, 2009; Kilelu et al., 2017b; Klerkx et al., 2012;
Perez-Aleman, 2010). Lastly, intermediaries may help in enhancing the institutional
environment, for example helping producer organisations lobby for favourable
legislation (Poulton et al., 2010).
This array of activities makes analysis of intermediation a challenging task. Additionally,
an important narrative has emerged that focusses on the importance of the ownership
structure of the intermediary as a decisive factor to achieve accelerated and broader
upgrading (Sabel, 1994; Schneider, 2004). Poulton et al. (2010) pick up on this when they
suggest that during the 1980s and 1990s private sector organisations were preferred as the
primary providers of business services as they were deemed more eﬃcient. However, whilst
this tended to improve outputs to markets in high productivity areas, as intervention of state
bodies was rolled back, it weakened market access in more remote areas. The argument
now more commonly made is that intermediary organisations based on public–private
ownership structure have advantages for the delivery of collective goods and services.
Within an agricultural development context, an example of this argument is illustrated by
McDermott et al.’s (2009) study of two clusters in the wine industry in Argentina, where
great stress as an explanation for the success of cluster transformations is placed upon the
intervention by organisations described as ‘‘Government Support Institutions’’ (GSIs) or
using Sabel’s (1994) term, ‘‘Developmental Associations’’. On the one hand, these are able to
respond to commercial realities that encourage them to establish lines of communication and
cross cutting ties between diﬀerent social and geographical producer communities. On the
other hand, the mandated requirement of these intermediaries to have ‘‘participatory
governance’’, whereby resources and membership of boards is made up of representatives
of the state, the regulator, the private sector, phytosanitary organisations and producer
associations on the governing and advisory boards ensures that the process of upgrading
is inclusive of smaller producers. Further examples include McEvily and Zaheer (1999)
and Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) who describe the establishment of public institutes
and training centres that help ﬁrms access new knowledge due to their mandates to
provide collective resources and collaborate with ﬁrms from distinct localities. The
contrast is drawn with, for example, producer associations which, whilst playing
important intermediary roles of coordination, their ownership structure leads them to
prioritise their members and preside over insular and vertical networks that beneﬁt their
members rather than all the actors within a cluster. Hence, re-ordering relationships is likely
to keep the basic network closed.
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Structures and governance of value chains and cluster
The basic premise upon which the above argument is built is that intermediaries can reshape
the existing structure and composition of organisational ﬁelds by instigating the creation of
new institutions with relevant stakeholder groups at the level of the cluster. Traditional views
of value chains involving small and medium-sized agricultural producers selling to exporters
emphasise the endemic power relations in quasi-hierarchical relationships (Giuliani et al.,
2005). Signiﬁcant roles are conferred to lead ﬁrms in determining upgrading opportunities to
local producers (Gereﬃ, 1999), such as through processing and packaging in fruit and
vegetables chains (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).
As discussed, the development of value chains with diﬀerent governance rules
highlights new opportunities for institutionally and socially embedded organisations such
as government agencies, consultants, associations, NGOs and other intermediaries to
support process and product upgrading. However, heterogeneous arrangements require
added insights into local production networks and the power relations inherent within
them. One approach that is particularly relevant to developing economy agribusiness is to
focus on the structural characteristics of local geographical clusters tied into value
chains. Humphrey and Schmitz suggest that upgrading happens in both value chains and
clusters although these represent a quite diﬀerent scope of analysis. Unlike value chains,
cluster analysis focusses on local inter-actor linkages (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002)
and therefore on speciﬁc production ensembles and the structure and composition of the
networks (McDermott et al., 2009). The structure of agribusiness clusters with a
preponderance of small producers is likely to be dominated by a small number of
exporters, large producers or service organisations. One can draw some parallels with
Markusen’s (1996) region-centred identiﬁcation of hub-and-spoke districts, where regional
structure revolves around one or several major corporations in one related specialised sector.
As well as cluster structure, analysis of knowledge transfer in clusters also needs to consider
cluster governance, by which is meant the coordination of economic activities between
producers and organisations through non-market relationships. This approach places
greater importance on issues of intermediary embeddedness. According to Granovetter
and Swedberg (2001), embeddedness refers to a detailed understanding of the mechanisms
and processes of the social construction of institutions and local business and non-business
networks. Embeddedness is closely tied to our account of how inter-organisational
governance evolves and how intermediaries (including individuals acting on behalf of
intermediary organisations) are able to coordinate production strategies and link
knowledge of local producers inside and outside the cluster. This includes questions such
as the history of associationalism and the density of relations between economic and social
organisations that underpin coherent public policy and collaboration between organisations.
Intermediaries can indeed play a crucial role in opening up links. However, deﬁning which
intermediary organisations assume this role and the extent of this inﬂuence will be in part
dependent on structures of pre-existing relations between producers involved in value chains
and productive clusters. A cluster with weak traditions of social capital and low bilateral
cooperation between producers will be more likely to depend on the organisation with
prime access to exporters or processors of raw materials. This dependence may leave little
space for a separate intermediary organisation, especially if many of the functions of
intermediation are performed by the large buyers or its producer association, albeit within
a structure based on tight bonds of dependency. By contrast, Tsai (2007) provides a view
of cluster governance where there exist high levels of civic participation and where
service organisations, including government bodies, share obligations and interests of the
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local community, which she contrasts with sectors characterised by fragmentation and
corruption. With more socially cohesive clusters, a demand is created for broader services
to facilitate economic development and social inclusion that creates spaces for specialised
services and intermediaries. Therefore, an analysis of the opportunities, boundaries and
limits of intermediary inﬂuence needs to incorporate both structures and governance of
agribusiness clusters in value chains and cluster governance.
A relational view of intermediary functions
Having discussed the structural and governance factors aﬀecting upgrading we can more
directly address the main question posed of intermediaries, ownership structures and impacts
in emerging clusters. As discussed earlier, ownership acts as an indicator of the likely
motivation of an organisation. However, in a number of empirical studies there appears
to be little consensus about what sort of intermediaries should undertake the role of
providing information, technical assistance and building capacity (Markelova et al., 2009).
This is partly because intermediaries can undertake diﬀerent roles, assume contrasting
objectives and have dissimilar motivations. For example, some intermediaries position
themselves as ‘‘neutral’’ and ‘‘honest’’ and claim to provide facilitating roles by bringing
together stakeholders and promoting collective action (Hellin, 2012; Klerkx and Leeuwis,
2009). Others have a key normative interest in achieving policy or business goals and actively
lobby for and translate interests of those they represent (Goldberger, 2008; Hargreaves et al.,
2013; Yang et al., 2014), or may aim to gain control over the relationships they mediate
(Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Obstfeld, 2005) or exploit these (Barrientos, 2013). Ownership
structure will provide a less than clear-cut indication of an intermediary’s actions where it
performs multi-roles and the same intermediary may serve diﬀerent audiences that have
diﬀerent needs. For example, private buyers will be primarily proﬁtmaking organisations
when acting as single buyers of local produce. Nevertheless, because of its cluster position as
a seller to an exporter, there may be also incentives for it to act as an intermediary
and provide collective services to small producer that supply its raw material, thereby
facilitating small farmers to ‘‘upgrade’’ in value chains (Raju and Singh, 2014). Other
examples include private organisations but based on collective governance such as
commodity boards and producer and industry organisations (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008;
Ton et al., 2007; Watkins et al., 2015; Bijman, 2016; Luo et al., 2017). Organisations may
also adopt multi-functions where the clusters are being orchestrated by a shared leadership
and diﬀerent intermediaries are active (Kilelu et al., 2013; Parag and Janda, 2014; Stewart
and Hyysalo, 2008) meaning there is not a single lead organisation/hub ﬁrm. In these cases,
the activities of intermediaries may need to serve the same audiences but for diﬀerent
purposes and therefore new functions are assumed.
An analysis of intermediation should therefore incorporate ownership structures of
relevant organisations, but a holistic account would view intermediary agency power as a
relational capability, emanating from its deliberate function to coordinate and/or support
the activities of communities of actors and to mediate between diﬀerent interests (Medd and
Marvin, 2004; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). The relational feature of this activity means that
how the intermediary relates to the structures and governance of local knowledge transfer in
value chains and local clusters critical. Moreover, as we have argued, it is not completely
clear that ownership structure provides a clear, singular or even dominant indication of
behaviour. Organisations playing intermediary roles can be inﬂuenced by negotiated
arrangements between ﬁrms and associations, civil society, corporate social responsibility
initiatives in value chains, as well as activist and consumer pressure (Barrientos et al., 2011).
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Indeed, a more useful approach may be to see that organisational practices are likely to
evolve from complex synergies (Rhodes, 1997) between actors that vie for similar spaces.
The case studies
The two clusters in which the empirical work was carried out are the palm oil cluster in the
municipality of Puerto Wilches in northeast Colombia that produces primarily within a
national supply chain, and the mango cluster in the Piura area of Northern Peru that is
inserted in a global value chain. Table 1 summarises some features of the clusters and
describes the main actors.
These clusters share a number of features. In both cases, there exist opportunities for
penetrating large markets and a numerical dominance of small sized producers. The average
size of the land for mango producer members of both producer associations is 51 ha and 9 ha
for palm oil producers. Nevertheless, we agree with Fernandez-Stark et al. (2012) that what
deﬁnes a small, medium and large producer in diﬀerent products is heterogeneous
and producers have diﬀerent levels of development that require support. In our case, we
distinguish small producers through their reliance on larger producers for access to markets.
A key competence in the mango is reaching certiﬁcation standards necessary for exports,
combating fruit plagues such as fruit ﬂy, incorporating a greater control and improvement in
the detail of production processes and technologies and establishing networks with a range
of buyers from diﬀerent export markets. In both clusters, the main responsibility for
upgrading and development of capabilities is the responsibility of local institutions
(including intermediaries). However, as a key cash crop productive sector, the mango
cluster in Peru has beneﬁtted from direct government intervention. This is through
PROMPERU, a public private intermediary agency that helps producers of mango.
The short window of production means that so far in Piura there are no large dominant
Table 1. Detail of mango and palm oil cluster characteristics.
Mango Oil palm
Size Omitting one large outlier producer,
the average size of PROMANGO
producers is 51 hectares and 124 for
APEM members.
Ranges from 7 to 26 hectares with an
average of 9 hectares.
Employees Just 5 out of 26 producers employs less
than 10 people, although work is
seasonal.
Mostly family. Some employees hired
that live locally.
Market 16 out of 26 producers sell product in
international markets.
Oil palm bunches are sold in local
market to processing mill. E1 is the
only processing mill represent in this
sample.
Certification 18 producers are certificated by
GlobalGap, 4 have Tesco TNC.
The most recognised certification is
given by the RSPO (Round on
Sustainable Palm Oil). Few oil palm
growers certified.
Other livelihood Some attempt to diversify to grape
production.
Most small farmers combine a small
amount (2 hectares) of traditional
products (banana, plantain, cassava,
and corn) with palm oil.
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ﬁrms, although there is a division between medium-sized ﬁrms that produce and export and
smaller producers that only produce and sell their products to the medium sized ﬁrms
(Clarke and Ramirez, 2014). The strong tradition of mango production in the area is
represented by two producer associations. These are APEM, the association of exporters
who are also producers, and PROMANGO that organises small producers without direct
access to exporters. Members of both associations make up around 30% of growers and
60% of production and form the centrepiece of the study, although key organisations at
local level include SENASA, the phytosanitary government body and other service
organisations play important roles. The producer organisations rapidly assumed an
important space for intermediation, including small producers that achieved a degree of
self-organisation through PROMANGO. The primarily focus in the mango is reaching
international certiﬁcation and accessing global markets. Eighteen of the producers
included in this study are certiﬁed by Global Gap and four ﬁrms have Tesco certiﬁcation.
In the case of the Colombian palm oil, the main feature is the growing importance of
small producers as a proportion of cultivated land. The industry was traditionally
dominated by 50 large oil reﬁnery ﬁrms, however in 2012 18.7% of the palm oil land
was cultivated by small producers (through ‘‘alliances’’ of producers in local clusters –
predominantly small farmers – and in farms of less than 20 hectares in size), up from 3.7%
in 1999 (Gomez, 2012). The result is that the relationship between ﬁrms has changed, with
large ﬁrms increasingly dependent on purchasing from small producers. Secondly, as with
the mango, the sector has experienced excess demand as a consequence of the rise in
domestic demand for bio-fuel and the spread of the Pudricion del Cogollo (PC),
(translated but root disease) an airborne disease that has wiped out large numbers of
palm trees. In the palm oil sector, few growers are certiﬁed, this being less important as
the product is processed before sold on the market. As will be discussed, the need to
deliver the fruit quickly to the reﬁnery after it has been cut means small producers will be
located close to reﬁneries that are in relatively close proximity. Hence, the intermediary is
often a private reﬁnery organisation that, apart from being a buyer, has had to assume the
provision of some collective services with the guidance of the technology arm of the palm
oil federation, CENIPALMA, through a scheme termed UATTA, whereby large ﬁrms
provide extension services. This represents a signiﬁcant formalisation of the role of the
private ﬁrm as an intermediary. These two cases were therefore chosen because they allow
an examination of the inﬂuence that the diﬀerent ownership structures of intermediaries
can have on cluster practices and upgrading, and the role that local governance within the
cluster plays in mediating intermediary inﬂuence.
Methodology
Our principle research question is how the process of upgrading of small producers in
agricultural clusters is inﬂuenced by intermediary organisations and how this inﬂuence is
conditioned by existing local governance relations. We discuss the proposition that the
ownership structure of intermediaries plays an important explanatory role in how
intermediaries intervene, but insist that the evolution of network structure of the cluster
will inﬂuence both the types of intermediaries that exist and which of these assume key
positions as measured though their centrality. Therefore, the engagement, impact and
even existence of the intermediary will emerge from a complex and contingent mix of
entities and structures. The data collection occurs in two agribusiness clusters in
Colombia and Peru that share some characteristics but contrast in terms of inter-producer
structures especially in regard to the levels of producer organisation (detailed below).
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The basis of our comparison is through patterns of inter-producer governance as
demonstrated in the network structure. Social network analysis (SNA) is used to provide
a structural analysis of the position of actors in the cluster and their relationships
(Wassermann and Faust, 1994). This allows us to observe which intermediaries are more
central and which are marginal and infer through the links they establish the inﬂuence they
may have on other actors. The analysis also provides information on the inﬂuence and
position of other organisations in the cluster (further details of SNA analysis below).
The second stage of the analysis involved interviews with key organisations, i.e. those that
network maps showed as important ‘‘brokers’’ (bring knowledge into the cluster by
establishing links outside the cluster) and ‘‘bridgers’’ (consolidate links between actors in
the network) (see below of details of actors interviewed).
The information for the SNA was gathered through two identical surveys, one for
producers (17 in the palm oil, 26 in the mango cluster), and one for service organisations
(9 in the mango cluster, 5 in the palm oil). Analysis of survey data was undertaken through
SNA techniques that permit visualisation and measurement of the structures of relationships
and the strategic of positioning of actors in these relationships. The question asked to
ﬁrms was: ‘‘from whom did your organisation (or business) receive technical assistance
and how important was this to your organisation’’? Respondents were provided a list of
organisations (producers, services, universities, consultancies) and an open section to name
other 15 organisations from whom assistance had been received and to then identify and
rank organisations from whom assistance was received from 1 to 5 in ascending order of
importance. From this information, it was possible to produce a network map using open
source software, Pajek, for SNA.
The interviews in the palm oil cluster involved two ground visits in Colombia and eight
semi-structured interviews. Because of the reduced numbers of actors present in the palm
oil cluster from which SNA information was gathered, these interviews included
representatives of large reﬁnery ﬁrms and small producers of two palm oil clusters
adjoining the cluster that is the focus of the study. Although SNA was not conducted
in these, the interview suggested a similar network structure, i.e. a dominant reﬁnery ﬁrm
surrounded by a number of small level producer suppliers. Interviews were also conducted
with high-level oﬃcials of two key intermediaries, CENIPALMA and FEDEPALMA.
FEDEPALMA is the Colombian palm oil’s oﬃcial producer association, whilst
CENIPALMA is the technology arm of FEDEPALMA. Two interviews were
conducted with CENIPALMA employees working in the ﬁeld, one of whom was also
shadowed over two days in the same palm oil cluster that was surveyed. Two interviews
were also held with small farmer representatives and two interviews also took place with
executives of large palm oil companies. In the case of the mango cluster, twenty semi-
structured interviews were held with owners of small and medium-sized mango ﬁrms and
directors of the main intermediaries including APEM, PROMANGO, the producer
associations and with PROMPERU. The producer association congresses of APEM
and PROMANGO were attended in Piura and detailed notes made as observers. We
are therefore able to study three types of intermediaries: public–private, producer
associations and private organisations. The purpose of the interviews is three-fold.
They provide background information on the challenges and strategies of each cluster
and technologies used. Secondly, by looking at the network maps produced in the ﬁrst
stage of the analysis and the resulting structure of networks, we can infer certain patterns
concerning the governance of inter-cluster relations (e.g. hub and spoke) which can then
be validated and explored in more detail through interviews. Finally, the interviews can
focus in detail on the intermediary as a provider or services and on users as consumers (i.e.
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producer ﬁrms) of these services and their impacts. Open questions were used to guide the
background to the clusters, semi-structured questions were used to deﬁne questions on
cluster relations and the intermediaries.
Findings from social network analysis
Table 2 shows the outdegree centrality values of the main service providers in the mango
cluster. Outdegree centrality represents the number of links emanating from the organisation
in question, i.e. how important is this organisation in terms of provider of knowledge in the
cluster. As shown, SENASA, the phytosanitary organisation with knowledge of treating
plant disease, is the most important provider of knowledge. APEM and PROMANGO,
the two industry associations, are the next most important. In addition, there are another
13 organisations, including private consultants, producers, government departments,
universities and certiﬁcation organisations that are present in the cluster and provide
signiﬁcant services to others. PROMPERU, the main public–private intermediary
established to promote new technology and exports plays a signiﬁcant role but is not as
inﬂuential as the other most central organisations.
Figure 1 provides a network map of the entire cluster. APEM and PROMANGO are
clearly shown at the centre of this network, receiving knowledge from a wide range of
organisations and linking together small producers. PROMPERU by comparison is in a
more marginal position. We focus the discussion on the cases of the two dominant producer
associations, APEM and PROMANGO, and PROMPERU as a PPG organisation.
Our discussion centres on the inﬂuence and position of the three intermediary
organisations: APEM, PROMANGO and PROMPERU. PROMPERU (The Commission
for the Promotion of Peru) was established in 1993 and although it is dependent on
the Ministry of Commerce, it acts as a public–private organisation through its provision
of both ﬁnancial and organisational support to exporting organisations. Its directorate is
made up of a mix of public and private sector representatives. The organisational structure
of PROMPERU reﬂects two important principles in the Peruvian political discourse as
put forward by a succession of Peruvian governments. The ﬁrst is to promote export-led
Table 2. Centrality of knowledge providers in the mango cluster.
Out degree centrality Organisation Type of organisation
2 Agro 19 Mango producer
2 La Molina University
2 Vinas Varona Private consultant
6 Control Union Certification Organisation
12 INIA Government Service
6 UNP University
11 Ministerio Agricultura Government Service
17 PROMPERU Government Service
15 National Mango Board Overseas Industry Association (US)
10 INCAGRO Government Service
9 SGS Certification Organisation
14 ADEX Government Service
17 PROMANGO Local industry association
22 APEM Local industry association
26 SENASA Government Service
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growth in the Peruvian economy and secondly to make this growth inclusive of poorer
groups of society.
PROMPERU has worked in several agricultural sectors encouraging knowledge transfer
and industry organisation needed for export success. In addition to accessing commercial
intelligence, it works with industry actors on market penetration strategies. It also has a
Figure 1. Social network analysis map of the mango cluster.
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special emphasis on supporting SMEs as this is recognised as an important sector within the
Peruvian economy. PROMPERU’s most inﬂuential period in the mango cluster was at
the end of the 1990s when it used its links to open up the international markets for
mango producers. Initially, it attempted to establish one local association for all mango
producers as a single point of contact for the industry to lower costs through economies of
scale and a route to encourage cooperation and joint learning. However, this failed and seed
money was provided ﬁrstly for APEM and shortly afterwards PROMANGO. According to
a PROMPERU representative, the separation of producer organisations had little to do with
commercial needs. As a PROMPERU manager commented:
if you are seeking to export then you are working with huge companies, they are asking for
volume and they are asking for quality. . .if you are not well organised then you do not have any
chance at all of entering international markets. They (APEM and PROMANGO) do not have a
diﬀerent strategy, and they do not have a diﬀerent way of proceeding.
And yet, the diﬀerences between small growers and medium-sized exporters are actually
signiﬁcant and structural. This is based in part on tensions in market transactions
(information asymmetry, price, timing of payment, quality). However, as will become
clear, these reveal more fundamental diﬀerences between individual and collective
approaches to the use of technology, the transfer of knowledge and social values of
solidarity and inclusion between the two communities of producers. Diﬀerences on these
issues have led to the development of parallel business models. With few resources to buy
fertilisers, small producers have adapted their model or production with sharing technology
(e.g. hot water treatment machines required for exports) and have been in a favourable
position to move into the organic market to which they are naturally suited to because it
requires few changes in the way the crop is produced. PROMPERU provided technical
knowledge on certiﬁcations and extended this to two associations of small producers,
Apromalpi in the Chulacanes region of Piura and Agrovida that have been able obtain
organic certiﬁcation.
The experience of PROMPERU highlights the importance that a PPG intermediary can
have by supporting collective action among diﬀerent groups of producers, including those
reliant on small-scale production. Its mission is deﬁned by the need to open up the cluster to
new markets, combining business acumen with commitment to support niches as well as
commodity production and markets. PROMPERU therefore created the formal outward
facing network links that has transformed this region into an export hub. Nevertheless, as
our network map suggests, the internal architecture of this network has reproduced rather
than replaced the historical structural cleavage between medium-sized direct exporters and
small producers. Once the export supply chains became established, PROMPERU’s role
became more peripheral and the producer associations APEM and PROMANGO assumed
the main coordinating roles.
A deﬁning feature of APEM (Peruvian Association of Mango Exporters) is its strong
commercial and business focus, which is a reﬂection of the pioneering export ﬁrms that ﬁrst
set it up. Its core competency is helping grower ﬁrms serve international export markets,
primarily the USA and Europe. In its early days it worked on improving the infrastructure,
including the port of Paita which serves the Piuran cluster. Since the mid-2000s, APEM has,
with support from PROMPERU, developed markets in East Asia including Japan, China
and, since 2014, South Korea. This has involved moving into better packaging and more
general product aesthetics through the selection of the Kent mango variety for export to
South Korea. A major step forward has been the establishment of a Standards Committee in
the early 2000s, made up of exporters, producer representatives and a local university
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researcher that meet regularly and evaluate international quality norms for mangos. It
produces a ‘‘technical norms’’ document for producers, providing guidance on sweetness
level, ﬁbrosity and colour in addition to specifying maximum limits for pesticide
contamination. APEM has been particularly eﬀective at preventing the ﬂooding of the US
market and subsequent fall in prices by coordinating with other mango exporters in South
America to monitor volumes being released for export. The market intelligence it obtains is
closely guarded and treated as secret, accessible only to APEM members.
As a representative for medium-sized larger exporters, its governance reﬂects its member’s
commercial interests. There has been some fundraising to facilitate certiﬁcation of small
producers (that sell to APEM members), but engagement with PROMANGO for example
is minimal and quality development centres on consolidation and vertical integration, rather
than through an inclusive-based network. Indeed, a number of APEM ﬁrms have acquired
land from small producers.
Like APEM, PROMANGO is a producer association that was formed in 2002 with seed
money from PROMPERU. Unlike APEM, it represents smaller producers that have little
direct access to international markets. PROMANGOmembers have had diﬃcult relationships
with larger exporting ﬁrms over a number of years and this was crucial in shaping how
PROMANGO was constituted. Its members are primarily concerned with the challenges of
producing (rather that selling) for the export market under diﬃcult soil conditions and an
erratic local climate. Much knowledge is tacit. The annual congress of PROMANGO is
dominated by discussion of treatment of diseases, management of fruit and diversiﬁcation
into other products. These practices have spawned a strong sense of community and as a
result, the actions of PROMANGO are primarily based on strengthening the network of
producers and enhancing collective actions. For example, the ﬁrst hot water treatment
machine was purchased between all members and its use is shared by all members of the
association. PROMANGO therefore has played a critical role as a bridge builder for
previously fragmented producers. As the director of PROMANGO stated:
the situation before was that all of the producers felt that they had the secret for producing good
mangos, and they didn’t wish to share it with anyone. . .. Through forming PROMANGO, we
started to share all types of information, group together what each ﬁrm was doing, and in this
way we created a network between the organizations members.
Decision-making processes tend to be open and members are kept together by bounds of
solidarity that has facilitated the sharing of some public goods. This shared technology is not
only about improving production, but also enhancing inclusion, since producers can have
diﬀerent abilities to upgrade. This contrasts sharply with APEM members that work
together for the express purpose of expanding markets and strengthening individual
practices. With limited resources, PROMANGO has enabled all of its members to obtain
EUROPGAP certiﬁcation, which is signiﬁcant since the European market is expanding and
pays a higher price than the US market. As its producers have developed, PROMANGO has
also worked on better coordination of the components of the mango production chain.
Previously members’ production had concentrated around the month of January, leading
to over-production, which aﬀected the revenue it earned. Experts from Israel and Brazil were
invited and visited the farms of members, providing advice, which helped members to
lengthen the production period from November to March.
The discussion of the mango cluster highlights cluster evolution as the outcome of new
opportunities, ongoing tensions between groups and negotiations between intermediary
organisations. Rather than imposing a set of top-down solutions as might have been the
case in the past, the state has intervened to ‘‘steer’’ a set of cluster actors towards the
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international market. The resulting cluster structure mirrors entrenched structures of power
and is reﬂected in the creation of two networks around APEM and PROMANGO. APEM’s
business orientation is outward looking and emphasises cross-cluster cooperation but does
not represent the cluster as whole. Indeed, the asymmetry of information between large and
small-sized producers has actually been magniﬁed, as small producers remain vulnerable to
climate and price ﬂuctuations in a way that large and medium ﬁrms have been able to
insulate themselves against. Hence, the historical fragmentation has become more
entrenched through the development of APEM. The inﬂuence of PROMPERU has been
constrained by resource limitations, geographical distance and the diﬃculties of working in a
cluster with a complex power structure. Nevertheless, it has used its position to make the
small producer networks visible and to carve out an independent route for access to
international markets.2 Without PROMPERU’S aid, small producers may well have
remained on the margins of the network.
The Colombia palm oil cluster
Colombia is the world’s 4th largest producer of palm oil. However, unlike production in
Malaysia and Indonesia that is dominated by large ﬁrms, the mutual dependence (and
tensions) between small producers and reﬁnery organisations is critical to understand the
palm oil industry in Colombia. As discussed above, at the time of the interviews, knowledge
transfer around new technologies and new organisational practices has been dominated by
the spread of the PC (translated but root disease), an airborne disease aﬀecting tropical
climate areas that has wiped out large numbers of palm trees. Large resources, including
R&D spending by CENIPALMA, have been devoted to developing alternative disease
resistant trees and prevention measures to stop the spread of the PC. Upgrading therefore
is dominated by the processes of preventative management of this phytosanitary disease
control that can strongly impact quality and eﬃciency of the palm oil fruit.
Critical to the adoption of this protocol is the ‘‘UATTAS’’, the national institutional
architecture drawn up by CENIPALMA for technology transfer. This involves creating an
alliance between small producers and a neighbouring reﬁnery ﬁrm for preventative treatment
of trees and vigilance. Each UATTA is supported by one agronomer per 3000–5000 ha and
one technical assistant per 1000–1500 ha and involves provision of technical services,
including adoption of ISO 9000 certiﬁcation. The reﬁnery ﬁrm acts as the intermediary
for the small producer, transferring practices from CENIPALMA. Technology transfer
therefore is designed in a top-down manner. The network architecture of the palm oil
cluster in Figure 2 shows this clearly. There is a reﬁnery organisation that we call E1 in
the middle of a network of small producers. CENIPALMA, the industry association, brings
knowledge in from outside the cluster and provides knowledge to E1 and has a direct link to
some of the small producers. In contrast to the mango case study, the palm oil cluster shown
in Table 3 and Figure 2 therefore shows a simple hub and spoke structure with information
largely centralised around two nodes. The small producers are almost totally dependent on
E1 for access to new knowledge. Moreover, there are very few bilateral links between the
organisations themselves.
We focus the discussion on the role of the industry association CENIPALMA and the
reﬁnery ﬁrm E1 as intermediaries in the knowledge transfer process with small producers.
As indicated earlier, the programme of technology transfer has been designed by
CENIPALMA. Its national coverage allows it to transcend narrow local interests and it
has advanced international cooperation agreements with palm oil related centres of
excellence around the world. The 2015 international palm oil congress held in Cartagena
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in Colombia brought together 1700 practitioners, 100 company representatives and expert
speakers from 30 countries. Ninety percent of the speakers were from overseas.
CENIPLAMA has a specialised R&D laboratory in Barrancabermeja staﬀed with
postgraduate technicians and is recognised as one of the top science centres in the
Figure 2. Social network analysis map of the palm oil cluster.
Table 3. Centrality of knowledge provides in the palm oil cluster.
Out degree centrality Organisation Type of organisation
2 FEDEPALMA Government Service
6 SENA Government Service
15 CENIPALMA Industry Association
15 E1¼Refinery and producer Private Producer
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country. It also has agricultural extension staﬀ with specialised knowledge in Palm oil and
the technicians are therefore strongly embedded in the sector. There is little representation of
small producers in CENIPALMA or FEDEPLAMA, its sister organisation, as most of the
subscriptions are made by large reﬁnery ﬁrms.
The UATTA framework for technology transfer reﬂects an eﬀort to rationalise the
fragmented nature of technology transfer in Colombia with many small-sized producers.
This means there is high reliance not only on agricultural extension workers in the diﬀerent
areas of the country, but also on technical specialists employed by the reﬁnery ﬁrms. Although
these are employees of the reﬁnery ﬁrm, this is a potential win-win situation for large and small
producers. Reﬁnery ﬁrms receive a steady supply of raw material from small producers, who in
turn receive technical assistance to improve productivity and disease prevention.
CENIPALMA states that there are currently 100 ‘‘strategic alliances’’, in so-called ‘‘inclusive
business’’ partnerships (Co´rdoba, 2011). However, a major problem is that ‘‘the technical teams
in the plantations do not work as a strategic unit, but rather as individuals’’ (Co´rdoba, 2011).
This reﬂects the diﬃculties of establishing uniform norms in highly contrasting climate and soil
conditions, but also the diverse local relations between small producers and reﬁnery ﬁrms.
The case of E1 is perhaps most signiﬁcant since this is a privately-owned organisation that
has been drawn into acting as an intermediary for surrounding producers through the
provision of collective services (e.g. agricultural extension, ﬁnancial loans). Its role needs
to be considered in the light of the changing relationship between large landowners involved
in agroindustry (some of whom have historically been based in the palm oil, others that have
diversiﬁed into the sector from livestock or bananas) and subsistence farming.3
In our interviews, we were able to discern contrasting attitudes by the large reﬁneries
towards their intermediary functions. Figure 2 demonstrates the case where the large reﬁnery
ﬁrm has stepped in to assist small farmers in the adoption of new techniques and other
assistance such as the provision of bridging loans and donations to local community schools.
It is this model that CENIPALMA has hoped to institutionalise across the industry based on
the close physical proximity between reﬁnery ﬁrms and small ﬁrms. However, as intimated, a
feature of the industry is the uneven geographical pattern of relationships between ﬁrms in
cluster. As a CENIPALMA oﬃcial commented:
There are some nucleos where the leading company is only really interested in buying the fruit, it
is not interested under which conditions this is produced, but there are cases of projects such as
Indupalma, where there is a contract between the anchor ﬁrm and where the whole sanitary
scheme is run by the anchor ﬁrm, the ally is just waiting to pay oﬀ the credit and they then take
charge of their plantation. So in some places it is working in others it hardly exists. . .this is very
new and requires a change in the scheme of things.
Where the UATTAS function, the motivations for the reﬁnery ﬁrm to support small producers
therefore reﬂects a combination of paternalism – a desire to help the conditions of small farmers
– and a more pragmatic awareness of the need to invest in the surrounding farms to stabilise
supply and halt the spread of the PC disease. Occasionally, this bypasses or layers on top of the
UATTA through relationships between a large reﬁnery ﬁrm and local producers.
However, it is also common for reﬁnery ﬁrms to show reluctance to involve themselves in
national institutional agreements to provide collective services. This view was underlined by
an executive of a neighbouring reﬁnery ﬁrm that, when asked to intermediate for small
producers commented:
We don’t feel responsible for their survival, and small producers don’t see us as having the
authority to make them.
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According to the respondent, apart from buying the fruit, the reﬁnery ﬁrm’s relationship
with its small cluster of neighbours was at the most lending money for fertiliser or other
costs. Ownership structure clearly explains the manner in which the intermediary roles of
each organisational are undertaken. CENIPALMA is an industry intermediary set up with a
deliberative function to provide collective service goods to its members. Provision of services
is dictated through its mission to provide technical and scientiﬁc expertise which is used to
assert its authority. For example, when asked about how the speciﬁc anti-PC practices it
developed was justiﬁed to users, a CENIPLAMA oﬃcial was clear:
In sanitary terms, it has to be done via the scheme we developed that uniﬁes criterion. Everybody
has to speak the same language. So if there is a user and he says ‘‘I have this experience of
working on this disease’’. . ..no sir, we are not going to do that, we have to follow the norms
developed from the agronomic committee. We have to have a uniﬁed criteria.
CENIPLAMA’s framework for intermediation is therefore driven by a technology-push logic
and the UATTA is built on increasing productivity that permeates across geographical and
contextual boundaries. This rationalises practices across the industry and, although it does not
have the authority of a government ministry, within the industry its style is strongly hierarchical.
The intermediary actions of the privately owned reﬁneries reﬂect a combination of pressures
and expectations. Expectations exist for reﬁneries to step in and help small producers introduce
preventative practices to stop the spread of the PC disease because they are indeed the only
organisation at local level with the resources to able to work with small producers. Nevertheless
responses vary. Some reﬁneries clearly recoil at the attempt to formalise their role of
intermediaries (perhaps following past experiences of less than loyal small producer allies4)
and because it gets in the way of their core activities. Other reﬁneries will undertake the
provision of collective services in a paternalist fashion to create reciprocal local ties.
The provision of intermediary services therefore reﬂects the ownership of the
intermediary, but also industry expectations and the history of local relationships between
reﬁnery and small producers. Ownership structure therefore is an important factor, but so
are local traditions. The absence of a tradition of collective organisation means paternalism
is often prevalent.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper has provided an account of the agency of intermediary organisations in a social
space deﬁned by clusters of agricultural producers related by networks of production and
diﬀering degrees of dependency. In terms of the research questions posed at the beginning of
the paper concerning intermediation and upgrading, although in both case studies
intermediaries are critical actors for the provision of collective services, it is also clear that
the extent, nature and scale of upgrading is linked to the type of organisation providing
intermediation and how it inﬂuences inter-producer governance relations. Ownership
structure and the position of the intermediary in the cluster plays a signiﬁcant role in this
process. Taking ﬁrst the case of the mango cluster, a signiﬁcant feature is that all
intermediaries facilitated in opening up the clusters to opportunities for radical changes in
production strategies, which resembles ﬁndings elsewhere on the contribution of
intermediaries (e.g. Kilelu et al., 2017a). PROMPERU, the public–private intermediary,
was indeed a crucial change agent. It advanced the broader government agenda to open
the mango cluster, assisted in upgrading and improved inter-cluster coordination.
Nevertheless, it was the producer associations, APEM and PROMANGO, that played the
main role in helping to build the capabilities to enter the export markets. Their source of
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legitimacy (and ability to do this) derived partly from their role as the principle agent of the
communities of producers, but also from the fact that, unlike PROMPERU, these
organisations are deeply embedded in the cluster and the relationships between producers.
However, as might be expected, these producer associations also replicated rather than
transformed the basic architecture of the network, reproducing the traditional knowledge
asymmetries between larger producers with direct access to exporters and smaller producers.
Direct exporters will therefore have advantages in terms of upgrading in speciﬁc features of this
value chain. On the other hand, PROMANGO, because of its strong intermediary agency role
is in a strong position to search for and open up alternative upgrading strategies in diﬀerent
value chains such as ethical trading. These would have signiﬁcant implications for inter-
producer governance relations.
The second case of the Colombian palm oil case also highlighted the critical role of the
intermediary for knowledge transfer and capability building, but with a privately owned ﬁrm
and in a context of weak small producer self-organisation. The private palm oil reﬁnery ﬁrms
sits at the centre of a highly centralised network structure in which sharing experiences and
learning-by-doing between the large ﬁrm and smaller producers to combat the phytosanitary
disease is critical to the survival of all actors in the cluster. The style of intermediation is
based on paternalism and reciprocal favours. The ﬁrm, E1, moreover is clearly not
comfortable with the formalisation of its intermediary position within the palm oil
system. In other words, it provides collective services but within a governance framework
that reﬂects its ownership mission. Major changes in governance in this top-down context
are unlikely to occur. We conclude the discussion with two points that reﬂect the broader
theoretical implications of our ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that although intermediaries clearly work
across boundaries and between diﬀerent actor groups and can potentially help to break
down insularity, their actions will also be inﬂuenced by existing governance relations
between incumbent actors. The most signiﬁcant diﬀerences in our study concerned the
ownership structure of intermediaries and level of small producer organisation.
Consequently, the contribution and ultimately the impact of intermediaries emerged from
the negotiation between the interests and pressures that these factors exercise. This is a point
supported by other studies such as Yang et al. (2014). Secondly, and following from the
previous point, the discussion also highlighted that it may be wise to eschew classifying
intermediary organisations into narrow deﬁnitions, roles, categories and indeed impacts.
Our discussion of intermediaries provided information of the diﬀerent roles and potential
impacts these organisations can have in the clusters. A similar point has been made by
Howells (2006) who highlights the varied roles and functions of intermediaries in
innovation, but also the range of more traditional service activities they often undertake.
Our study is in line with these conclusions, but in addition points to ownership, inter-
producer governance relations and embeddedness as factors that inﬂuence intermediary
functions. The implication is that, rather than forcing ﬁxed labels and narrow functions
(and impacts) to an intermediary, more holistic approaches can provide more fruitful
avenues to future studies.
In the terms of the advantages and limitations of the methods used in this study, the use
of both SNA and qualitative methods in this study is novel and provides a broad canopy
to investigate intermediation within a speciﬁc context that includes structural
relationships between cluster actors, the governance relations that underpin these and
the embeddedness of intermediaries within these relations. Nevertheless, it is clear that
more research within the context of development and agriculture is necessary before
moving to typologies of how agribusiness cluster structures relate to diﬀerent forms of
intermediation.
18 Environment and Planning A 0(0)
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following ﬁnancial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article: The authors acknowledge the support of CENIPALMA, APEM and
PROMANGO for the production of this paper and the ﬁnancial support of the British Academy
for the study of the Peruvian mango cluster. We are also indebted to the anonymous reviewers for
their valuable comments.
Notes
1. By the term ‘‘agribusiness clusters’’, we refer to spatial agglomerations of producers and services for
the production and processing of one or more food related product within an extended commercial
value chain, national or international.
2. Its agency arses partly from its legitimacy as a neutral actor in the local power structure and agent of
the ministry of commerce (and seed money resources) and secondly its competence in establishing
links with outside organisations such as exporters and marketing organisations.
3. Land ownership in rural areas and agriculture in general in Colombia have historically been a
source of tension between those involved in agroindustry, where agricultural production is
primarily a business and a section of whom at times have used fraudulent or violent means to
expand control of the land, and smaller producers who consider work on the land a means of
making a basic living. This was especially the case in the period 1990 and 2010 where in some areas a
reconfiguration of land ownership took place as a consequence of expropriation of land for palm oil
use.
4. It is fairly common for small producers to renounce local agreements to sell to the nearest refinery
and instead accept a slightly higher price from a different refinery.
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